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Abstract
Modal public announcement logics study how beliefs change af-
ter public announcements. However, these logics cannot express the
reason for a new belief. Justification logics fill this gap since they
can formally represent evidence and justifications for an agent’s be-
lief. We present OPAL(K) and JPAL(K), two alternative justification
counterparts of Gerbrandy–Groeneveld’s public announcement logic
PAL(K). We show that PAL(K) is the forgetful projection of OPAL(K),
respectively of JPAL(K), and we establish that JPAL(K) partially re-
alizes PAL(K). The question whether a similar result also holds for
OPAL(K) is still open.
1 Introduction
Justification logics are epistemic logics that feature explicit reasons for an
agent’s knowledge and belief. Instead of an implicit statement A that
stands for the agent knows A, justification logics include explicit statements
of the form t :A that mean t justifies the agent’s knowledge of A. In these
statements, the evidence term t may represent a formal mathematical proof
of A or an informal reason for A.
Originally, Artemov developed justification logic to provide a constructive
semantics for intuitionistic logic. Later these logics were introduced into
formal epistemology where they provide a novel approach to certain epistemic
puzzles and to several problems of multi-agent systems [1, 2, 3, 4, 7].
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Dynamic epistemic logic [20] studies the relationship between communi-
cation, knowledge, and belief. It is based on the language of modal logic
enriched with statements to express various forms of communication. A ba-
sic form of communication is provided by public announcements where a
statement A is publicly communicated to all the agents. The logic of public
announcements [16, 13] uses a statement [A]B to express that B holds after
the public announcement of A.
In this paper, we are interested in belief rather than in knowledge and,
hence, rely on Gerbrandy–Groeneveld’s axiomatization of public announce-
ments [13]. One of its postulates is
(A→ [A]B)↔ [A]B , (1)
which says, from left to right, that an agent who believes that B must be
the case whenever a true fact A is announced will believe B after an actual
announcement of A.
To illustrate how this principle works, we briefly recall the following ex-
ample from [8]. Elite-level frequent flyers can usually check in for their flight
at the business counter by presenting their elite membership card, which can
also be attached to their luggage to make public their elite status. This
check-in rule is known to airline employees. In this situation, it follows by
the implication (1) that when Ann presents her elite membership card to
Bob at the business counter, he knows that he should check her in.
Modal public announcement logic tells us how beliefs change after public
announcements but not why. It is the aim of this paper to formalize possible
answers to this why using the approach of justification logic. If we convert the
left to right implication from (1) to a statement with explicit justifications,
we obtain something like
s : (A→ [A]B)→ [A]t :B , (2)
where s represents the airline’s regulations regarding business-counter check-
in procedures and t is the reason why Bob starts checking Ann in.
The question is how the terms s and t, which represent justifications,
relate to each other; in particular, how to arrive at t given s. We use the
above example to discuss different answers to this question. There are the
following possibilities.
1. t = s. The regulations themselves tell Bob to check Ann in. This option
is implemented in the logic JPAL(K), which we developed jointly with
Bryan Renne and Joshua Sack [6].
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2. t = ⇑ s. The operator ⇑ represents the inference Bob has to make from
the regulations after the elite card is shown. This approach is taken by
the logic OPAL(K), which we introduced in [8].
3. t = ⇑A s. The inference process explicitly mentions both the regula-
tions, s, and the demonstration of Ann’s elite card, A. We do not
consider this variant since it would make schematic reasoning impos-
sible. Indeed (1) is an axiom scheme that does not depend on the
announcement. Therefore, the operation that represents the update on
the level of terms should not depend on the announcement either.
As already argued in [8], the simplicity of the first option, axiomatized
by JPAL(K), may not always be sufficient. Imagine that Ann has been up-
graded to business class (say, as a reward for postponing her original flight,
which had been overbooked). So, according to the same regulations, she can
check in with Bob based on her ticket alone without announcing her elite
status, which in our notation is represented by s :B. But Ann may choose to
announce her elite status anyways, or [A]s :B in our notation. In JPAL(K),
where t = s, after the elite status is announced, t encodes two different
reasons for Bob to check Ann in: as a business-class customer and as an
elite flyer. By contrast, in OPAL(K), these two reasons are represented by
two different terms, s and ⇑ s, of which the latter depends on Ann’s elite
status while the former is due to the ticket alone. And Bob would want
to distinguish between the two reasons because of the difference in baggage
allowances: an elite frequent flyer is often allowed to check more luggage for
free than an owner of a business-class ticket who has been upgraded from
economy.
In addition, in this and similar cases, the approach of JPAL(K) implies
that the meaning of the regulations changes after public announcements: if
Ann has an economy ticket, the regulations do not allow her a business-
counter check-in until she shows her elite card, and then they do. This is
a little counterintuitive since the regulations are a legal document whose
meaning should not be changed by each public announcement. The use of
reason ⇑ s enables us to separate the permanent status of the regulations
from their momentary applications influenced by public announcements.
Let us now look at the other direction of (1)—from right to left—and
see how the first two options manifest themselves there. The implication
states that an agent who will believe B after an announcement of A must
believe that, if A is true and announced, B holds after the announcement.
For instance, if Charlie, while standing in a long line at the economy check-
in counter, sees Ann showing her elite card and being served by Bob at
the business counter, [A]B, then Charlie has empirical evidence e that
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Ann is served at the business counter, [A]e :B. It would be natural for
Charlie to believe that having an elite status and showing it gets one to
the business counter, (A → [A]B). But it seems even clearer in this case
that Charlie’s empirical observation e cannot explain the causality of the
implication A → [A]B. If before Ann showed up, Charlie had read the sign
that invited elite members to the business counter, then Charlie’s memory
of this sign, refreshed by Ann’s actions, could serve as such an explanation.
Thus, instead of using e, as in JPAL(K), in this example it also seems better
to use ⇓ e, where ⇓ is yet another new operation of our logic OPAL(K).
So far, not much work has been done to provide explicit justifications
for dynamic epistemic logic. Besides the already mentioned [6, 8], there is
Renne’s earlier research on introducing new evidence [17] and eliminating un-
reliable evidence [19] in the framework of justification logic. He also presents
expressivity results for certain justification logics with announcements [18].
However, the modal counterparts of Renne’s systems do not correspond
to any traditional public announcement logic whereas both JPAL(K) and
OPAL(K) are intended as justification logics with public announcement oper-
ators whose belief dynamics closely corresponds to the modal belief dynamics
of Gerbrandy–Groeneveld’s modal public announcement logic PAL(K) [13].
In the next section, we recall the axiomatization and basic properties of
PAL(K). In particular, we present the reduction of a PAL(K) formula A to a
provably equivalent formula red(A) that does not contain public announce-
ment operators. This reduction facilitates a simple completeness proof for
PAL(K) by reducing it to completeness of the basic modal logic K.
As mentioned before, JPAL(K) and OPAL(K) (both with additional pos-
itive introspection axioms) were introduced in [6] and [8] respectively where
we also established soundness and completeness for these two logics. We
recall the definitions of OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) and their semantics in Sec-
tions 3 and 4. We reprove soundness and completeness for OPAL(K) and
JPAL(K) in Section 5. Since the replacement property does not hold in jus-
tification logics, we cannot establish completeness of either logic by reducing
it to completeness of the basic justification logic J. Instead we perform a
canonic model construction for each of the two logics.
Section 6 is the main part of the paper. It deals with the formal rela-
tionship of PAL(K) and JPAL(K), respectively OPAL(K). The relationship is
described by means of the notion of forgetful projection: given a justification
logic formula A, its forgetful projection A◦ is a modal formula that is given
by replacing each evidence term in A with . We get the following theorem.
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Theorem (Forgetful Projection). For all justification logic formulas A,
JPAL(K) ` A =⇒ PAL(K) ` A◦ ,
OPAL(K) ` A =⇒ PAL(K) ` A◦ .
More interesting and much more difficult is the converse direction. To
formulate it in a precise way, we need the notion of realization: given a
modal formula A, a realization of A is a justification logic formula r(A) such
that (r(A))◦ = A. We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem (Realization). For all modal formulas A that do not contain
modalities within announcements,
PAL(K) ` A =⇒ JPAL(K) ` r(A) for some realization r(A) of A.
We establish the Realization Theorem in the following way. First, we
reduce the PAL(K) formulaA to a provably equivalent formula red(A) that has
no announcement operators, i.e., red(A) is a traditional modal logic formula.
Then we use realization for modal logic (without public announcements) to
obtain a justification logic formula r(red(A)) that realizes red(A). Finally,
we ‘invert’ the reduction from A to red(A) on the justification logic side to
obtain a formula r(A) that realizes A.
A r(A)
red(A) r(red(A))
Reduction
K realization
Replacement to ‘invert’ red
Forgetful projection
This realization by reduction approach is a novel technique in the realm
of justification logic. The closest analog of this method can be found in [11],
where S5 is realized by reducing it to K45. However, there the reversal of
the reduction is trivial, while in our setting it requires an involved extension
of Fitting’s replacement theorem [10]. First, we need replacement also for
formulas with public announcements and, second, we need replacement also
in negative positions (the original proof in [10] only deals with replacement in
positive positions). While we only show this extended replacement theorem
for JPAL(K), there seems to be little or no extra work required to prove the
same extended replacement theorem for OPAL(K). The problem lies in the
application of this replacement theorem to reverse the modal reduction on
the justification side for OPAL(K). The exact nature of the problem is too
technical to be explained in the introduction and is pointed out in the proof of
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Theorem 43, Footnote 4. We only mention here that the problem concerns
reversing in OPAL(K) the modal update reduction in a negative position.
Thus, we obtain realization only for JPAL(K). It is open whether a similar
result can be shown for OPAL(K).
The replacement theorem requires that there exist realization functions
that satisfy the technical condition of non-self-referentiality on variables. By
a result of Kuznets [14], we know that such realization functions exist for
the modal logic K. Therefore, we formulate OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) as jus-
tification counterparts of public announcement logic over K. The original
versions of these two logics in [6, 8] included axioms for positive introspec-
tion, and we claimed in [8] that realization holds for JPAL with positive
introspection. However, it is not clear whether there always exist realization
functions for positive introspection (i.e., K4) that are non-self-referential on
variables. Thus, it is still open whether a realization theorem holds for public
announcements in the presence of positive introspection.
The results presented in this paper are based on the conference papers [6,
8] that did not include full proofs.
2 Modal Public Announcement Logic
In this section, we recall some of the basic definitions and facts concern-
ing the Gerbrandy–Groeneveld modal logic of public introspective announce-
ments [12, 13, 20], i.e, public announcements that need not be truthful but
are trusted by all the agents.
Definition 1 (PAL(K) Language). We fix a countable set Prop of atomic
propositions. The language of PAL(K) consists of the formulas A ∈ Fml,[·]
formed by the grammar
A ::= p | ¬A | (A→ A) | A | [A]A p ∈ Prop
The language Fml of modal formulas without announcements is obtained
from the same grammar without the [A]A constructor.
The Gerbrandy–Groeneveld theory PAL(K) of Public Announcement Logic
uses the language Fml,[·] to reason about belief change and public announce-
ments.
Definition 2 (PAL(K) Deductive System). The axioms of PAL(K) consist
of all Fml,[·]-instances of the following schemes:
1. Axiom schemes for the modal logic K
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2. [A]p↔ p (independence)
3. [A](B → C)↔ ([A]B → [A]C) (normality)
4. [A]¬B ↔ ¬[A]B (functionality)
5. [A]B ↔ (A→ [A]B) (update)
6. [A][B]C ↔ [A ∧ [A]B]C (iteration)
The deductive system PAL(K) is a Hilbert system that consists of the above
axioms of PAL(K) and the following rules of modus ponens (MP) and neces-
sitation (N):
A A→ B
B
(MP) ,
A
A (N) .
We write PAL(K) ` A to state that A ∈ Fml,[·] is a theorem of PAL(K).
Lemma 3 (Admissible Announcement Necessitation, [20]). Announcement
necessitation is admissible in PAL(K): that is, for all formulas A,B ∈ Fml,[·],
we have
PAL(K) ` A implies PAL(K) ` [B]A .
PAL(K), like many traditional modal public announcement logics, features
the so-called reduction property : Fml,[·]-formulas can be reduced to provably
equivalent Fml-formulas [12, 13, 20]. That means one can express what the
situation is after an announcement by saying what the situation was before
the announcement. The following lemma formally describes this reduction
procedure (for a proof, see, for instance, [20]). The proof method was first
introduced by Plaza in [16].
Definition 4 (Announcement Redexes and their Reducts). The following
are five pairs of redexes and their reducts:
Redex Its reduct
[A]p p
[A]¬B ¬[A]B
[A](B → C) [A]B → [A]C
[A]B (A→ [A]B)
[A][B]C [A ∧ [A]B]C
(3)
Definition 5 (Reduction). The one-step reduction function red1 : Fml,[·] →
Fml,[·] is defined as follows: If no subformula of A ∈ Fml,[·] is a redex, then
red1(A) := A. Otherwise, let R be the outermost leftmost subformula occur-
rence of A that is a redex, i.e.,
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1) if R is a proper subformula occurrence of R′, which is a subformula oc-
currence of A, R′ is not a redex;
2) if R is a subformula occurrence of C and B → C is a subformula occur-
rence of A, no redex can occur in B.
In this case, red1(A) is defined as the result of replacing the formula occur-
rence R in A with its reduct. Note that R is outside of announcements in A.
Indeed, if R occured in B with [B]C being a subformula occurrence of A,
then [B]C would itself be a redex, which is prohibited by item 1) above.
It is easy to show, using a formula rank similar to the one from Defi-
nition 28, that for any formula A ∈ Fml,[·], there exists N > 0 such that
redN+11 (A) = red
N
1 (A), which must then be an Fml-formula. In this case,
redn1 (A) = red
N
1 (A) for any n ≥ N and we define red(A) := redN1 (A).
Lemma 6 (Provable Equivalence of Reductions). For all A ∈ Fml,[·], we
have PAL(K) ` A↔ red1(A), and, consequently, PAL(K) ` A↔ red(A).
Remark 7. The above lemma facilitates a completeness proof for PAL(K) by
reducing it to completeness of K. The completeness is proved with respect
to the class of all Kripke models. To evaluate validity of formulas with
announcements, the standard Kripke semantics is extended with a model
update operation for introspective announcements. To save space, instead of
formulating this semantics, we refer the reader to [20, Section 4.9] and give
only a sketch of the completeness proof. Suppose that A ∈ Fml,[·] is valid.
Then red(A) is also valid by Lemma 6 and by soundness of PAL(K), which is
easy to show directly. Since red(A) is a formula of Fml, completeness of K
yields K ` red(A) and, hence, PAL(K) ` red(A) because PAL(K) extends K.
Applying Lemma 6 again, we conclude that PAL(K) ` A. As a corollary of the
soundness of PAL(K), since the semantics for PAL(K) extends the standard
Kripke semantics, PAL(K) is a conservative extension of K.
3 Justification Logic
Our language extends the language typically used in justification logic by
adding public announcement formulas [A]B and two unary operations on
terms, ⇑ and ⇓, to express the update dynamics of evidence.
Definition 8 (Language). In addition to the set of propositions Prop, we fix
countable sets Cons of constants and Vars of variables. Our language consists
of the terms t ∈ Tm and the formulas A ∈ FmlJ formed by the grammar
t ::= x | c | (t · t) | (t+ t) | ⇑ t | ⇓ t x ∈ Vars, c ∈ Cons
A ::= p | ¬A | (A→ A) | t :A | [A]A p ∈ Prop
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A term is a ground term if it does not contain variables. The language
introduced in [6, 8] for justification logics with public announcements includes
additionally an operation ! on terms that is used for positive introspection.
Since the logics OPAL(K) and JPAL(K), to be introduced below, do not have
an introspection axiom, we can dispense with the ! operation.
Remark 9. To state axioms of our systems JPAL(K) and OPAL(K), we use
arbitrary finite sequences of announcements, which is not done in modal
public announcement logics. This use of sequences may seem puzzling, es-
pecially given that the iteration axiom of PAL(K), which normally allows to
replace any such finite sequence with a single announcement, is transferred
to JPAL(K) and OPAL(K) as is. But recall that the replacement property
does not hold for justification logics, as already mentioned earlier. Replac-
ing single announcements with sequences of announcements in axioms is the
minimally invasive solution we have found to ensure the admissibility of the
announcement necessitation rule, which is clearly valid semantically. For in-
stance, if a theorem B is obtained by modus ponens from C → B and C, it
follows by announcement necessitation that [A1] . . . [An]B should be deriv-
able. For n = 1, the normality axiom of PAL(K) takes care of the transition
from [A1](C → B) and [A1]C to [A1]B. In order to make such a transition
possible for an arbitrary n > 0 we generalize the normality axiom to allow
an arbitrary finite sequence of announcements [A1] . . . [An].
Notation 10 (Sequences of Announcements). σ and τ (with and without
subscripts) will denote finite sequences of formulas. ε denotes the empty
sequence. Given such a sequence σ = (A1, . . . , An) and a formula B, the
formula [σ]B is defined as follows:
[σ]B := [A1] . . . [An]B if n > 0 and [ε]B := B.
Further, we define σ,B := (A1, . . . , An, B) and B, σ := (B,A1, . . . , An). For
a sequence τ = (C1, . . . , Cm), we define τ, σ := (C1, . . . , Cm, A1, . . . , An). We
will also need the length |σ| of a sequence σ, which is given by |ε| := 0 and
|(A1, . . . , An)| := n.
Definition 11 (OPAL(K) Deductive System). The axioms of OPAL(K) con-
sist of all FmlJ-instances of the following schemes:
1. [σ]A, where A is a classical propositional tautology
2. [σ](t : (A→ B)→ (s :A→ t · s :B)) (application)
3. [σ](t :A→ t+ s :A), [σ](s :A→ t+ s :A) (sum)
4. [σ]p↔ p (independence)
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5. [σ](B → C)↔ ([σ]B → [σ]C) (normality)
6. [σ]¬B ↔ ¬[σ]B (functionality)
7. [σ]t : (A→ [A]B)→ [σ][A]⇑ t :B (update ⇑)
8. [σ][A]t :B → [σ]⇓ t : (A→ [A]B) (update ⇓)
9. [σ][A][B]C ↔ [σ][A ∧ [A]B]C (iteration)
The deductive system OPAL(K) is a Hilbert system that consists of the above
axioms of OPAL(K) and the following rules of modus ponens (MP) and axiom
necessitation (AN):
A A→ B
B
(MP) ,
c1, . . . , cn ∈ Cons C is an OPAL(K)-axiom
[σ1]c1 : · · · : [σn]cn :C (AN) ,
where σi’s are (possibly empty) finite sequences of formulas.
We sometimes use some of the same names for both axioms of OPAL(K)
and axioms of PAL(K) because it will always be clear from the context which
of the two is meant.
Besides OPAL(K), we also consider the deductive system JPAL(K), which
does not assign any particular meaning to the two term operations ⇑ and ⇓.
Definition 12 (JPAL(K) Deductive System). The axioms of JPAL(K) are
the axioms of OPAL(K) where the two update axiom schemes are replaced
by the single scheme
[σ]t : (A→ [A]B)↔ [σ][A]t :B . (update)
The deductive system JPAL(K) is a Hilbert system that consists of the axioms
of JPAL(K) and the rules (MP) and (AN), where the formula C in (AN) now
stands for an axiom of JPAL(K).
We will use OPAL(K) ` A and JPAL(K) ` A to express that A is derivable
in OPAL(K) and JPAL(K), respectively. If the deductive system does not
matter, for instance when A is derivable in both of them, then we use ` A.
The following example gives some intuition as to how the deductive sys-
tems work and what their differences are.
Example 13. For any p ∈ Prop and any c1, c2 ∈ Cons, we have
1. OPAL(K) ` [p]⇑(c1 · c2) : p and
2. JPAL(K) ` [p](c1 · c2) : p.
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Proof. We use PR to denote the use of propositional reasoning. By AN for
the tautology ([p]p↔ p)→ (p→ [p]p) we have
` c1 :
(
([p]p↔ p)→ (p→ [p]p)) . (4)
By AN for the independence axiom [p]p↔ p we have
` c2 : ([p]p↔ p) . (5)
From (4) and (5) we obtain by the application axiom and PR
` (c1 · c2) : (p→ [p]p) . (6)
In OPAL(K) we get from (6) by the update axiom ⇑ and PR
OPAL(K) ` [p]⇑(c1 · c2) : p .
In JPAL(K) we get from (6) by the update axiom and PR
JPAL(K) ` [p](c1 · c2) : p .
We see that, independent of the truth value of an atomic proposition p,
after p is announced, there is a reason to believe p. In JPAL(K) this reason is
given by the term c1 · c2. In OPAL(K) the term is ⇑(c1 · c2). In the latter case,
the presence of ⇑ in the evidence term clearly signifies that this evidence for p
is contingent on a prior public announcement. However, the exact content of
such a public announcement, p in our case, is not recorded in the term. This
design decision enables us to avoid the overcomplexification of the language
and is similar to the introspection operation in the traditional justification
logics: !t is evidence for t :A whenever t is evidence for A; however, the
formula A is not recorded in the term !t.
Remark 14. The announcement-free fragment of OPAL(K) and JPAL(K)
(that is the first three axiom schemes with σ = ε, rule MP, and rule AN,
restricted to c1 : · · · : cn :C) is the well-known justification logic J (see [5]).
The following lemma states a standard property of justification logics that
holds for OPAL(K) and JPAL(K); it can be proved by an easy induction on
the length of derivation.
Lemma 15 (Internalization). If C1, . . . , Cn ` A, then there is a term t(y1, . . . , yn)
for fresh variables y1, . . . , yn such that
y1 :C1, . . . , yn :Cn ` t(y1, . . . , yn) :A .
Corollary 16 (Constructive Necessitation). For any formula A, if ` A,
then there is a ground term t such that ` t :A.
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4 Semantics
We adapt the Kripke-style semantics for Justification Logic due to Fitting [9].
Our semantics uses Kripke models augmented by evidence functions that
relate each world–term pair (w, t) to a set of formulas E(w, t) that the term t
can justify at the world w.
Definition 17 (Frame). A frame is a pair (W,R) that consists of a set W 6= ∅
of (possible) worlds and of an accessibility relation R ⊆ W ×W .
Definition 18 (Evidence Function). A function E : W × Tm → P (FmlJ) is
called evidence function if it satisfies the following closure conditions:
1. Axioms: if c :A is derivable by the AN-rule, then A ∈ E(w, c) for any
w ∈ W .
2. Application: if (A→ B) ∈ E(w, t) and A ∈ E(w, s), then B ∈ E(w, t·s).
3. Sum: E(w, s)∪E(w, t) ⊆ E(w, s+ t) for any s, t ∈ Tm and any w ∈ W .
In a model of OPAL(K) or JPAL(K), there is an evidence function Eσ for
each finite sequence σ of formulas. The idea is that the evidence function Eσ
models the “evidential situation” that arises after the formulas in σ have
been publicly announced.
Definition 19 (Model). A model is a structure M = (W,R, E , ν), where
(W,R) is a frame, ν : Prop → P(W ) is a valuation, and function E maps
finite sequences σ of formulas to evidence functions Eσ. An OPAL(K) model
satisfies the following three conditions:
A→ [A]B ∈ Eσ(w, t) implies B ∈ Eσ,A(w,⇑ t) , (7)
B ∈ Eσ,A(w, t) implies A→ [A]B ∈ Eσ(w,⇓ t) , (8)
Eσ,A,B(w, t) = Eσ,A∧[A]B(w, t) . (9)
A JPAL(K) model satisfies (9) and, instead of (7) and (8), the condition
A→ [A]B ∈ Eσ(w, t) if and only if B ∈ Eσ,A(w, t) . (10)
Conditions (7), (8), (9), and (10) correspond to the update axiom ⇑,
the update axiom ⇓, the iteration axiom, and the update axiom of JPAL(K)
respectively.
Remark 20. Our notion of model is non-empty. Simple sample models for
OPAL(K) and JPAL(K) can be found in [8] and [6], respectively.
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Definition 21 (Truth in a Model). A ternary relation M, w  A for for-
mula A being satisfied at a world w ∈ W in a model M = (W,R, E , ν) is
defined by induction on the structure of A:
• M, w  p if and only if w ∈ ν(p).
• Boolean connectives behave classically.
• M, w  t :A if and only if 1) A ∈ Eε(w, t) and 2) M, v  A for
all v ∈ W with R(w, v).
• M, w  [A]B if and only ifMA, w  B, whereMA = (WA, RA, EA, νA)
is defined as follows: WA := W ; RA := {(s, t) | R(s, t) and M, t  A};
(EA)σ := EA,σ; and νA := ν. Note that if M is an OPAL(K) model,
thenMA satisfies conditions (7)–(9) from Def. 19 and hence also is an
OPAL(K) model. Similarly, ifM is a JPAL(K) model, thenMA satisfies
conditions (9) and (10) and hence also is a JPAL(K) model.
We write M  A to mean that M, w  A for all w ∈ W . We say that
formula A is OPAL(K) valid, written OPAL(K)  A, to mean thatM  A for
all OPAL(K) models M. Formula A is JPAL(K) valid, written JPAL(K)  A,
if M  A for all JPAL(K) models M.
For a sequence τ = (A1, . . . , An) of formulas we useMτ = (Wτ , Rτ , Eτ , ντ )
to denote the model (· · · ((MA1)A2) · · · )An . Note that (Eτ )σ = Eτ,σ; in par-
ticular, (Eτ )ε = Eτ .
To illustrate how the semantics works, we prove a semantic version of the
result from Example 13.
Example 22. For any p ∈ Prop and any c1, c2 ∈ Cons, we have
1. OPAL(K)  [p]⇑(c1 · c2) : p and
2. JPAL(K)  [p](c1 · c2) : p.
Proof. Let M = (W,R, E , ν) be an arbitrary model and let w ∈ W . By
Def. 18.1, we have ([p]p ↔ p) → (p → [p]p) ∈ Eε(w, c1) and ([p]p ↔ p) ∈
Eε(w, c2). Thus, (p→ [p]p) ∈ Eε(w, c1 · c2) by Def. 18.2.
Assume now thatM is an OPAL(K) model. Then, by condition (7) from
Def. 19, we have p ∈ Ep(w,⇑(c1 · c2)). Since Rp(w, v) implies M, v  p,
i.e., v ∈ ν(p) = νp(p), we have Mp, w  ⇑(c1 · c2) : p by Def. 21 and, hence,
M, w  [p]⇑(c1 · c2) : p.
Assume that M is a JPAL(K) model. Then, by condition (10) from
Def. 19, we have p ∈ Ep(w, c1 · c2). As above we then findMp, w  (c1 · c2) : p
and M, w  [p](c1 · c2) : p.
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5 Soundness and Completeness
Lemma 23 (Soundness). For all formulas A ∈ FmlJ, we have
1. OPAL(K) ` A implies A is OPAL(K) valid,
2. JPAL(K) ` A implies A is JPAL(K) valid.
Proof. As usual the proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of A.
We only show the cases concerning the axioms about announcements.
1. Independence (OPAL(K) and JPAL(K)). M, w  [σ]p iff Mσ, w  p iff
w ∈ νσ(p) iff w ∈ ν(p) iff M, w  p.
2. Normality (OPAL(K) and JPAL(K)). M,w  [σ](B → C) iff Mσ,w 
B → C iff Mσ,w1B or Mσ, wC iff M, w 1 [σ]B or M, w  [σ]C
iff M, w  [σ]B → [σ]C.
3. Functionality (OPAL(K) and JPAL(K)). M, w  [σ]¬B iffMσ, w  ¬B
iff Mσ, w 1 B iff M, w 1 [σ]B iff M, w  ¬[σ]B.
4. Update (JPAL(K)). M, w  [σ]t : (A → [A]B) is equivalent to the
conjunction of
A→ [A]B ∈ Eσ(w, t) (11)
and
Mσ, v  A→ [A]B for all v with Rσ(w, v) . (12)
By the condition (10) on E from Def. 19, we obtain that (11) if and
only if
B ∈ Eσ,A(w, t) . (13)
Moreover, (12) is equivalent to
Mσ, v  A implies Mσ, v  [A]B for all v with Rσ(w, v) .
This is equivalent to
Mσ, v  A implies Mσ,A, v  B for all v with Rσ(w, v) ,
which, in turn, is equivalent to
Mσ,A, v  B for all v with Rσ,A(w, v) .
The conjunction of this and (13) is equivalent to
Mσ,A, w  t :B ,
or, equivalently,
M, w  [σ][A]t :B .
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5. Update ⇑ (OPAL(K)). This case is similar to the ⇒ direction of the
update case for JPAL(K).
6. Update ⇓ (OPAL(K)). This case is similar to the ⇐ direction of the
update case for JPAL(K).
7. Iteration (OPAL(K) and JPAL(K)). First we show that
Rσ,A,B = Rσ,A∧[A]B . (14)
Rσ,A,B(u, v) is equivalent to
Rσ(u, v) and Mσ, v  A and Mσ,A, v  B .
This is equivalent to
Rσ(u, v) and Mσ, v  A ∧ [A]B ,
which, in turn, is equivalent to Rσ,A∧[A]B(u, v) and thus (14) is estab-
lished.
The case for iteration is now as follows:
M, w  [σ][A][B]C
if and only if
Mσ,A,B, w  C .
By condition (9) on E from Def. 19 and by (14), this is equivalent to
Mσ,A∧[A]B, w  C
which, in turn, is equivalent to
M, w  [σ][A ∧ [A]B]C .
The traditional modal logic reduction approach (see Remark 7) to estab-
lishing completeness is not possible in the presence of justifications since the
replacement property does not hold in Justification Logic (see [10, Sect. 6]
for a detailed discussion of the replacement property in Justification Logic).
That means, in particular, that ` A ↔ B does not imply ` t :A ↔ t :B,
which would be an essential step in the proof of a justification-analog of
Lemma 6. Thus, it is not possible to transfer the completeness of J (see [9,
15]) to OPAL(K) or JPAL(K). We will, instead, provide a canonical model
construction to prove the completeness of OPAL(K) and JPAL(K). In the
following we let S stand for either OPAL(K) or JPAL(K).
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Definition 24 (Maximal S-Consistent Sets). A set Φ of FmlJ-formulas is
called S-consistent if there is a formula that cannot be derived from Φ in S.
A set Φ is called maximal S-consistent if it is consistent but has no consistent
proper extensions.
It can be easily shown that maximal S-consistent sets contain all axioms
of S and are closed under modus ponens and axiom necessitation.
Definition 25 (Canonical S Model). We define the canonical S model M =
(W,R, E , ν) as follows:
1. W := {w ⊆ FmlJ | w is a maximal S-consistent set},
2. R(w, v) if and only if for all finite sequences σ and all t ∈ Tm, we have
[σ]t :A ∈ w implies [σ]A ∈ v,
3. Eσ(w, t) := {A ∈ FmlJ | [σ]t :A ∈ w},
4. ν(p) := {w ∈ W | p ∈ w}.
To establish completeness, we need to know that the canonical model is
a model.
Lemma 26 (Correctness of the Canonical Model).
1. The canonical OPAL(K) model is an OPAL(K) model.
2. The canonical JPAL(K) model is a JPAL(K) model.
Proof. First, we observe that the set W is non-empty: by Remark 20, there
exists a model and the set of all formulas that are true at some world of the
model is maximally consistent. We next show that Eσ is an evidence function
for each σ.
• Axioms. For any c :A derivable by AN, [σ]c :A is also derivable for any
σ. Hence, [σ]c :A ∈ w and A ∈ Eσ(w, c).
• Application. Assume A → B ∈ Eσ(w, t) and A ∈ Eσ(w, s). We then
have [σ]t : (A→ B) ∈ w and [σ]s :A ∈ w. By the application and nor-
mality axioms, we get [σ](t · s) :B ∈ w. Thus, B ∈ Eσ(w, t · s).
• Sum. This is similar to the previous case.
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For a canonical OPAL(K) model M it remains to be shown that M sat-
isfies conditions (7), (8), and (9) from Def. 19. Let us show condition (7).
We have A → [A]B ∈ Eσ(w, t) if and only if [σ]t : (A → [A]B) ∈ w. By
the update axiom ⇑, the latter implies [σ][A]⇑ t :B ∈ w, which is equivalent
to B ∈ Eσ,A(w,⇑ t). Conditions (8) and (9) are shown similarly using the
update axiom ⇓ and the iteration axiom respectively.
For a canonical JPAL(K) modelM it remains to be shown thatM satisfies
conditions (10) and (9) from Def. 19, which is similar to the proof of the
conditions for OPAL(K).
Remark 27. The canonical OPAL(K) model and the canonical JPAL(K)
model are both degenerate, i.e., the canonical model consists of isolated ir-
reflexive worlds.
Proof. ⊥ → F is an axiom for any F . In particular, ` ⊥ → [⊥]F is an
axiom for any F . By AN, for any F , we have ` c : (⊥ → [⊥]F ), where c is
a constant. By the update axiom and the update axiom ⇑ respectively, for
any formula F , we have ` [⊥]s :F for some ground term s. Hence, for any
F , the formula [⊥]s :F is contained in each maximal consistent set, that is
in each world of the canonical model. Let w be such a world and assume
towards a contradiction that v is accessible from w. We then have by Def. 25
that [⊥]F ∈ v for any F . In particular, both [⊥]F ∈ v and [⊥]¬F ∈ v.
By the functionality axiom, the latter implies ¬[⊥]F ∈ v, which contradicts
[⊥]F ∈ v since v is consistent. Thus, there cannot be a world v that is
accessible from w.
Definition 28 (Rank). The rank rk(A) of a formula A is defined as follows:
1. rk(p) := 1 for each p ∈ Prop
2. rk(¬A) := rk(A) + 1
3. rk(A→ B) := max(rk(A), rk(B)) + 1
4. rk(t :A) := rk(A) + 1
5. rk([A]B) := (2 + rk(A)) · rk(B)
Lemma 29 (Reductions Reduce Rank). For all formulas A,B,C and all
terms s, t, we have the following:
1. rk(A) > rk(B) if B is a proper subformula of A
2. rk([A]¬B) > rk(¬[A]B)
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3. rk([A](B → C)) > rk([A]B → [A]C)
4. rk([A]s :B) > rk(t : (A→ [A]B))
5. rk([A][B]C) > rk([A ∧ [A]B]C)
Proof. Let us only show the last two cases. First, case 4.
rk([A]s :B) = (2 + rk(A)) · (rk(B) + 1)
= (2 + rk(A)) · rk(B) + 2 + rk(A)
> (2 + rk(A)) · rk(B) + 1 + 1
= rk(t : (A→ [A]B)) .
And now case 5.
rk([A][B]C) = (2 + rk(A)) · (2 + rk(B)) · rk(C)
= (4 + 2rk(A) + 2rk(B) + rk(A)rk(B)) · rk(C)
≥ (6 + 2rk(B) + rk(A)rk(B)) · rk(C)
> (2 + 3 + (2 + rk(A)) · rk(B)) · rk(C)
= (2 + rk(¬(A→ ¬[A]B))) · rk(C)
= rk([A ∧ [A]B]C) .
Lemma 30 (Truth Lemma). LetM be the canonical OPAL(K) model or the
canonical JPAL(K) model. For all formulas D and all worlds w in M, we
have D ∈ w if and only if M, w  D.
Proof. Proof by induction on rk(D) and a case distinction on the structure
of D. Let us only show the cases where D is of the form [A]B. The other
cases are standard and follow easily from the maximal consistency of w and
the definition of the canonical model.
1. D = [A]p. Suppose [A]p ∈ w. By the independence axiom, this is
equivalent to p ∈ w. By the induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to
M, w  p, which is equivalent toM, w  [A]p by the soundness of the
independence axiom.
2. D = [A]¬B. Suppose [A]¬B ∈ w. By the functionality axiom, this is
equivalent to ¬[A]B ∈ w. By the induction hypothesis, this is equiv-
alent to M, w  ¬[A]B, which is equivalent to M, w  [A]¬B by the
soundness of the functionality axiom.
3. D = [A](B → C) is shown similarly using the normality axiom.
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4. D = [A]t :B andM is the canonical OPAL(K) model. Suppose [A]t :B ∈
w. By the update axiom ⇓, we then have ⇓ t : (A→ [A]B) ∈ w. By the
induction hypothesis, this is equivalent to M, w  ⇓ t : (A → [A]B),
which implies, in particular, thatM, v  A→ [A]B whenever R(w, v).
Equivalently, M, v  [A]B whenever R(w, v) and M, v  A. Equiva-
lently, MA, v  B whenever RA(w, v). In addition, by the definition
of E , we have B ∈ EA(w, t). To summarize, we have MA, w  t :B. In
other words, M, w  [A]t :B.
Suppose [A]t :B /∈ w. By the definition of E , we have B /∈ EA(w, t).
Hence, MA, w 1 t :B. In other words, M, w 1 [A]t :B.
5. D = [A]t :B andM is the canonical JPAL(K) model. Suppose [A]t :B ∈
w. By the update axiom this is equivalent to t : (A → [A]B) ∈ w. By
the induction hypothesis this is equivalent to M, w  t : (A → [A]B),
which by the soundness of the update axiom is equivalent to M, w 
[A]t :B.
6. D = [A][B]C. Suppose [A][B]C ∈ w. By the iteration axiom, this
is equivalent to [A ∧ [A]B]C ∈ w. By the induction hypothesis, this
is equivalent to M, w  [A ∧ [A]B]C, which, by the soundness of the
iteration axiom, is equivalent to M, w  [A][B]C.
As usual, the Truth Lemma implies completeness, which, as a corollary,
yields announcement necessitation.
Theorem 31 (Completeness). For all formulas A ∈ FmlJ, we have
1. OPAL(K) ` A if and only if A is OPAL(K) valid,
2. JPAL(K) ` A if and only if A is JPAL(K) valid.
Proof. Soundness was already shown in Lemma 23. For completeness of
OPAL(K), consider the canonical OPAL(K) model M = (W,R, E , ν) and as-
sume that OPAL(K) 0 A. Then {¬A} is consistent and, hence, contained
in some maximal consistent set w ∈ W . By Lemma 30, it follows that
M, w  ¬A and, hence, that M, w 1 A. Since M is an OPAL(K) model
(Lemma 26), we have shown that OPAL(K) 0 A implies OPAL(K) 1 A. Com-
pleteness of OPAL(K) follows by contraposition. Completeness of JPAL(K) is
established similarly.
Corollary 32 (Announcement Necessitation). Announcement necessitation
is admissible: that is, for all formulas A,B ∈ FmlJ, we have
1. OPAL(K) ` A implies OPAL(K) ` [B]A,
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2. JPAL(K) ` A implies JPAL(K) ` [B]A.
Proof. Assume OPAL(K) ` A. By soundness, OPAL(K)  A. Therefore,
M  A for all OPAL(K) models M. In particular, MB, w  A for all
OPAL(K) models of the form MB and worlds w in them. Thus, we obtain
M, w  [B]A for all M, w. By completeness, we conclude OPAL(K) ` [B]A.
The case for JPAL(K) is shown similarly.
6 Forgetful Projection and Realization
This section deals with the relationship between PAL(K) and dynamic justi-
fication logics. We show that for any theorem of either OPAL(K) or JPAL(K),
its forgetful projection, which is obtained by replacing each term with , is
a theorem of PAL(K).
Definition 33 (Forgetful Projection). The mapping ◦ : FmlJ → Fml,[·] is
defined as follows:
p◦ = p for all p ∈ Prop, ◦ commutes with connectives ¬ and → ,
(t :A)◦ = A◦ ([A]B)◦ = [A◦]B◦ .
For a sequence σ = (A1, . . . , An) of FmlJ-formulas, we define σ
◦ to be the
sequence (A1
◦, . . . , An◦) of Fml,[·]-formulas. In particular, ε◦ := ε.
Theorem 34 (Forgetful Projection of JPAL(K) and OPAL(K)). For all for-
mulas A ∈ FmlJ,
JPAL(K) ` A =⇒ PAL(K) ` A◦ ,
OPAL(K) ` A =⇒ PAL(K) ` A◦ .
Proof. We use induction on a derivation in JPAL(K), respectively in OPAL(K).
We need to show that the statement holds for all the axioms of JPAL(K),
respectively of OPAL(K), for all instances of the rule AN, and is preserved
by the rule MP, the two rules being common for the two logics. To simplify
dealing with axioms, we first note that for each sequence σ of FmlJ-formulas,
there exists a formula Uσ ∈ Fml,[·] such that PAL(K) ` [σ◦]D ↔ [Uσ]D for
any formula D ∈ Fml,[·]. This is trivial if |σ| = 1 and follows from the modal
iteration axiom if |σ| > 1. If σ = ε, Uε := p ∨ ¬p for some proposition p.
Thus, to show that forgetful projections of all axioms, of JPAL(K) and
OPAL(K), are derivable in PAL(K), it is sufficient to consider these projec-
tions with [Uσ] substituted for [σ
◦]. Most of the axioms are actually common
between the two logics, which makes the proof shorter. If A is a proposi-
tional tautology, so is A◦. Therefore, [Uσ]A◦ can be derived in PAL(K) by
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using the announcement necessitation rule, which is known to be admissible
in PAL(K) by Lemma 3. Similarly, the application and sum axioms have a
form [σ]C where C◦ is a theorem of PAL(K): in case of the application axiom,
C◦ = (A◦ → B◦)→ (A◦ → B◦), it is an axiom of K; in case of the sum
axiom, C◦ = A◦ → A◦, it is a propositional tautology. So again [Uσ]C◦ is
derivable via announcement necessitation. For the independence, normality,
and functionality axioms, [Uσ]p ↔ p, [Uσ](B◦ → C◦) ↔ ([Uσ]B◦ → [Uσ]C◦),
and [Uσ]¬B◦ ↔ ¬[Uσ]B◦ are instances of the modal independence, nor-
mality, and functionality axioms, respectively. Finally, the remaining ax-
ioms of JPAL(K) have the form [σ]D ↔ [σ]E where D◦ ↔ E◦ is an in-
stance of the corresponding modal axiom: (A◦ → [A◦]B◦)↔ [A◦]B◦ and
[A◦][B◦]C◦ ↔ [A◦ ∧ [A◦]B◦]C◦, respectively. The update ⇑ and update ⇓
axioms of OPAL(K) have a form [σ]D → [σ]E where D◦ → E◦ is one direc-
tion of the equivalence in the modal update axiom. It remains to note that
F → G
[U ]F → [U ]G is known to be admissible in PAL(K).
The forgetful projection of the AN rule has a form [σ1
◦] . . . [σn◦]C◦
where the derivability of C◦ in PAL(K) has just been demonstrated. There-
fore, it is sufficient to use the modal necessitation rule n times and the
announcement necessitation rule |σ1| + · · · + |σn| times to get the desired
result.
Finally, if B is obtained by MP from A → B and A, by induction hy-
pothesis, A◦ → B◦ and A◦ are theorems of PAL(K). Hence, so is B◦.
A much more difficult question is whether a dynamic justification logic,
such as JPAL(K) or OPAL(K), can realize PAL(K): that is, whether for any
theorem A of PAL(K), it is possible to replace each  in A with some term
such that the resulting formula is a dynamic justification validity.
In the remainder of this paper we present the first realization technique
for dynamic justification logics and establish a partial realization result for
JPAL(K): it can realize formulas A that do not contain  operators within
announcements. Our main idea is to reduce realization of PAL(K) to real-
ization of K. In our proof, we rely on notions and techniques introduced by
Fitting [10].
Definition 35 (Substitution). A substitution is a mapping from variables to
terms. If A is a formula and σ is a substitution, we write Aσ to denote the
result of simultaneously replacing each variable x in A with the term xσ.
The following lemma is standard in justification logics and can be proved
by a simple induction on the derivation of A.
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Lemma 36 (Substitution Lemma). For every formula A of FmlJ and every
substitution σ,
JPAL(K) ` A implies JPAL(K) ` Aσ,
OPAL(K) ` A implies OPAL(K) ` Aσ.
In most justification logics, in addition to this substitution of proof terms
for proof variables, the substitution of formulas for propositions is also possi-
ble (see [2]). However, the latter type of substitution typically fails in logics
with public announcements, as it does in both JPAL(K) and OPAL(K).
Definition 37 (Annotations). An annotated formula is an Fml,[·]-formula in
which each modal operator is annotated by a natural number. An annotated
formula is properly annotated if modalities in negative positions are anno-
tated with even numbers, modalities in positive positions are annotated with
odd numbers, and no index i annotates two modality occurrences. Positions
within an announcement [A] are considered neither positive nor negative:
i.e., the parity of indices within announcements in properly annotated for-
mulas is not regulated. If A′ is the result of replacing all indexed modal
operators i with  in a (properly) annotated formula A, then A is called a
(properly) annotated version of A′.
Definition 38 (Realization Function). A realization function r is a mapping
from natural numbers to terms such that r(2i) = xi, where x1, x2, . . . is
a fixed enumeration of all variables. For a realization function r and an
annotated formula A, r(A) denotes the result of replacing each indexed modal
operator i in A with the term r(i). For instance, r(iB) = r(i) : r(B). A
realization function r is called non-self-referential on variables over A if, for
each subformula 2iB of A, the variable xi = r(2i) does not occur in r(B).
The following realization result for the logic K is due to Brezhnev [5]; the
additional result about non-self-referentiality on variables follows from the
stronger statement that K can be realized without any self-referential cycles
of arbitrary terms, proved in [14].
Theorem 39 (Realization for K). If A′ is a theorem of K, then for any
properly annotated version A of A′, there is a realization function r that is
non-self-referential on variables over A and such that r(A) is provable in J.
Clearly, (r(A))◦ = A′.
In order to formulate the replacement theorem for JPAL(K), a technical re-
sult necessary for demonstrating the partial realization theorem for JPAL(K),
we use the following standard convention: whenever D(q) and A are formulas
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in the same language, D(A) is the result of replacing all occurrences of the
proposition q in D(q) with A. In most cases, q has only one occurrence in
D(q) that is not within announcements.
For the rest of this section, we consider only formulas A ∈ Fml,[·] and
their annotated versions that do not contain modal operators within an-
nouncements: i.e., if [B]C is a subformula of A, then B does not contain
modal operators.
We will use a theorem that was first proved by Fitting [10] for replacement
in positive positions in LP. We use his method in a richer language and
for a different logic and also use replacement in both positive and negative
positions. Thus, in the interests of self-containment, we give a more general
formulation that we need and prove it. The proof is an adaptation of Fitting’s
proof from [10].
Theorem 40 (Restricted Realization Modification for JPAL(K)). Assume
the following:
H-1. A proposition p has exactly1 one occurrence in a properly annotated
formula X(p) that is outside of announcements. X(A) and X(B) are
properly annotated formulas with no modalities within announcements.
H-2. r1 is a realization function, non-self-referential on variables over X(A).
H-3. If p occurs positively in X(p), JPAL(K) ` r1(A)→ r1(B).
If p occurs negatively in X(p), JPAL(K) ` r1(B)→ r1(A).
Then for each subformula ϕ(p) of X(p) that occurs outside of announcements,
there is some realization/substitution pair 〈rϕ, σϕ〉 such that:
C-1. JPAL(K) ` r1(ϕ(A))σϕ → rϕ(ϕ(B)) if ϕ(p) occurs positively in X(p).
JPAL(K) ` rϕ(ϕ(B))→ r1(ϕ(A))σϕ if ϕ(p) occurs negatively in X(p).
C-2. σϕ lives on input positions in ϕ(p), i.e., xiσϕ = xi if 2i does not occur
in ϕ(p);
C-3. σϕ meets the no new variable condition, i.e., the only variable that may
occur in xσϕ is x;
C-4. If r1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B), then rϕ is also
non-self-referential on variables over X(B).
1While the proof of this theorem does not depend on whether p actually occurs in X(p),
the formulation of H-1 is simpler when it does.
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Proof. Assume that hypotheses H-1, H-2, and H-3 hold. We proceed by
induction on the complexity of the subformula ϕ(p). Call a subformula oc-
currence ϕ(p) of X(p) good provided there is some 〈rϕ, σϕ〉 such that C-1,
C-2, C-3, and C-4 hold; we also say 〈rϕ, σϕ〉 is a witness to the goodness of
ϕ(p).2 We show that every subformula occurrence of X(p) that is outside of
announcements is good.
Let ϕ(p) be a subformula occurrence of X(p) that is outside of announce-
ments. Then this occurrence must be either positive or negative in X(p).
Assume as an induction hypothesis, that all its proper subformula occur-
rences are good; note that they must also be outside of announcements. We
show ϕ(p) itself is good. There are several cases to consider.
Base case. If ϕ(p) is atomic, set rϕ := r1 and σϕ to be the identity
substitution.
C-2 and C-3. The identity substitution lives on input positions in any
formula and meets the no new variable condition.
C-4. If r1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B), so is rϕ = r1.
C-1. Here further subcases have to be considered:
C-1. Base subcase 1. ϕ(p) = q, where q is a proposition different from p.
Whether this occurrence of q is positive or negative in X(p),
r1(ϕ(A))σϕ → rϕ(ϕ(B)) = rϕ(ϕ(B))→ r1(ϕ(A))σϕ = q → q ,
which is clearly derivable in JPAL(K).
C-1. Base subcase 2. ϕ(p) = p. This subformula occurs in X(p) exactly
once. If it occurs positively, C-1 requires JPAL(K) ` r1(ϕ(A))σϕ → rϕ(ϕ(B))
or JPAL(K) ` r1(A) → r1(B), which follows from H-3 for the positively
occurring p.
If p occurs negatively, C-1 requires JPAL(K) ` rϕ(ϕ(B)) → r1(ϕ(A))σϕ
or JPAL(K) ` r1(B) → r1(A), which follows from H-3 for the negatively
occurring p.
Negation case. If ϕ(p) = ¬θ(p) and 〈rθ, σθ〉 has been constructed, set
rϕ := rθ and σϕ := σθ. We show that 〈rϕ, σϕ〉 witnesses the goodness of an
occurrence of ¬θ(p) in X(p) under the assumption that 〈rθ, σθ〉 witnesses the
goodness of the corresponding occurrence of θ(p).
2Despite X(p) being properly annotated, a subformula ϕ(p) may have several occur-
rences in X(p), including occurrences of opposite polarities, if ϕ(p) contains no modalities.
While rϕ and σϕ are the same for all occurrences of ϕ(p), independent of their polarities,
the statement of C-1 does depend on the polarity of of the occurrence. Hence, we define
rϕ and σϕ for subformulas, but the goodness must be determined for each occurrence of
a subformula separately.
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C-2, C-3, and C-4 for ϕ(p) easily follow from C-2, C-3, and C-4 for θ(p)
because rϕ = rθ and σϕ = σθ. For C-2, it is sufficient to note that any 2i
occurring in θ(p) also occurs in ¬θ(p).
C-1. The statement that needs to be demonstrated depends on the polar-
ity of this occurrence of ¬θ(p). We only show one of the two cases since the
other is analogous. Let this occurrence be positive. Then the corresponding
occurrence of θ(p) is negative and JPAL(K) ` rθ(θ(B))→ r1(θ(A))σθ by C-1
for θ(p). By contraposition, JPAL(K) ` r1(¬θ(A))σϕ → rϕ(¬θ(B)), which is
C-1 for the positively occurring ¬θ(p).
Implication case. If ϕ(p) = θ(p) → η(p) and 〈rθ, σθ〉 and 〈rη, ση〉 have
been constructed, set σϕ := σθση and
rϕ(n) :=

rθ(n)ση if n occurs in θ(B)
rη(n)σθ if n occurs in η(B)
r1(n) otherwise.
.
This rϕ is well-defined, i.e., n cannot occur in both θ(B) and η(B), since
θ(B)→ η(B) is a subformula of X(B), which is properly annotated by H-1.
We show that 〈rϕ, σϕ〉 witnesses the goodness of an occurrence of θ(p)→ η(p)
in X(p) whenever 〈rθ, σθ〉 and 〈rη, ση〉 witness the goodness of the correspond-
ing occurrences of θ(p) and η(p).
It is also necessary to show that our rϕ is a realization function, i.e.,
rϕ(2i) = xi. Since rθ(2i) = rη(2i) = r1(2i) = xi, we only need to show
that neither ση, when 2i occurs in θ(B), nor σθ, when 2i occurs in η(B),
changes xi. Given the symmetry of the two situations, we only consider the
former, when 2i occurs in θ(B). Since θ(B) → η(B) is a subformula of
X(B), which is properly annotated by H-1, θ(B) can share no annotations
with η(B), and even less so with η(p). Thus, xi is not in input position in
η(p) and is not changed by ση, which lives on input positions in η(p) by C-2.
This completes the proof that rϕ is a realization function.
We now show that the two substitutions commute: σθση = σησθ. By C-2
for θ(p) and η(p), the substitutions σθ and ση live on input positions in θ(p)
and η(p), respectively. These input positions do not overlap since θ(p)→ η(p)
is a subformula of X(p), which is properly annotated by H-1. Hence, each
variable is changed by at most one of these substitutions. Clearly, if neither
substitution changes xi, then neither composition changes it either, so that
xiσθση = xiσησθ = xi. If one of the substitutions, call it σ, changes xi, the
other substitution, call it τ , changes neither xi nor xiσ, the latter because
the only variable it contains is xi by C-3 for one of θ(p) or η(p). Hence,
xiστ = xiσ = xiτσ. It follows that σϕ = σθση = σησθ.
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C-2. By C-2 for θ(p) and for η(p), we have xiσϕ = xiσθση = xi if xi is
not in an input position in θ(p)→ η(p).
C-3 for ϕ(p) easily follows from C-3 for θ(p) and η(p).
C-4. Suppose r1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B). Then
both rθ and rη are so, too, by C-4 for θ(p) and η(p). Hence, a variable xk
does not occur in r1(n), in rθ(n), or in rη(n) for any n occurring in Z(B)
for some subformula 2kZ(B) of X(B). Since, by C-3 for θ(p) and η(p),
neither σθ nor ση introduces new variables, the variable xk does not occur in
rθ(n)ση or in rη(n)σθ either. Thus, xk does not occur in rϕ(Z(B)) and rϕ is
non-self-referential on variables over X(B).
C-1. The statement that needs to be demonstrated depends on the po-
larity of this occurrence of θ(p) → η(p). We only show one of the two cases
since the other is analogous. Let this occurrence be positive. The the corre-
sponding occurrence of θ(p) is negative and the corresponding occurrence of
η(p) is positive. In order to show C-1, i.e.,
JPAL(K) ` [r1(θ(A))σϕ → r1(η(A))σϕ]→ [rϕ(θ(B))→ rϕ(η(B))].
It is sufficient to show
JPAL(K) ` rϕ(θ(B))→ r1(θ(A))σϕ (15)
JPAL(K) ` r1(η(A))σϕ → rϕ(η(B)). (16)
By C-1 for this negative occurrence of θ(p), JPAL(K) ` rθ(θ(B))→ r1(θ(A))σθ.
Hence, JPAL(K) ` rθ(θ(B))ση → r1(θ(A))σθση by the Substitution Lemma,
which can be rewritten as JPAL(K) ` rϕ(θ(B))→ r1(θ(A))σϕ. This yields (15).
By C-1 for this positive occurrence of η(P ), JPAL(K) ` r1(η(A))ση → rη(η(B)).
Hence, by the Substitution Property, JPAL(K) ` r1(η(A))σησθ → rη(η(B))σθ,
which can be rewritten as JPAL(K) ` r1(η(A))σϕ → rϕ(η(B)). This yields (16).
Modal case. If ϕ(p) = iθ(p) and 〈rθ, σθ〉 has been constructed. Un-
like in other cases, this subformula, due to i in it, can only occur once
in X(p). Accordingly we can talk about the goodness and polarity of this
subformula rather than about those of its occurrences. The parity of i de-
termines whether ϕ(p) is a positive or a negative subformula. We show that
〈rϕ, σϕ〉 witnesses the goodness of the subformula of iθ(p) in X(p) under
the assumption that 〈rθ, σθ〉 witnesses the goodness of the corresponding oc-
currence of θ(p). In the modal case, the construction of rϕ and σϕ depends
on the polarity of ϕ(p) in X(p).
Modal subcase 1. If iθ(p) is a positive subformula of X(p) so that i is
odd, set σϕ := σθ. By C-1 for this positive occurrence of θ(p), JPAL(K) `
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r1(θ(A))σθ → rθ(θ(B)). By Internalization, construct a ground term u1 such
that
JPAL(K) ` u1 : [r1(θ(A))σθ → rθ(θ(B))] (17)
and set
rϕ(n) :=
{
[u1 · r1(i)]σθ if n = i
rθ(n) otherwise.
C-2 and C-3 for ϕ(p) easily follow from C-2 and C-3 for θ(p) because
σϕ = σθ. For C-2, it is sufficient to note that any 2j occurring in θ(p) also
occurs in iθ(p).
C-4. Suppose r1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B). Then
rθ is so, too, by C-4 for θ(p). Hence, a variable xk does not occur in either
r1(Z(B)) or rθ(Z(B)) for any subformula2kZ(B) ofX(B). The only change
from rθ(Z(B)) to rϕ(Z(B)) happens in the realization of i if i occurs in
Z(B): rθ(i) becomes [u1 ·r1(i)]σθ. Given that, in this case, xk does not occur
in r1(i), u1 contains no variables, and σθ does not introduce new variables
by C-3 for θ(p), the variable xk does not occur in rϕ(Z(B)). Hence, rϕ is
non-self-referential on variables over X(B).
C-1. JPAL(K) ` (r1(i)σθ) : [r1(θ(A))σθ]→ (u1 ·(r1(i)σθ)) : rθ(θ(B)) follows
from (17) by the application axiom and MP. Since
(r1(i)σθ) : [r1(θ(A))σθ] = [r1(i) : r1(θ(A))]σθ = r1(iθ(A))σθ = r1(ϕ(A))σθ ,
we have JPAL(K) ` r1(ϕ(A))σθ → (u1 ·(r1(i)σθ)) : rθ(θ(B)). Since u1 contains
no variables, JPAL(K) ` r1(ϕ(A))σθ → [u1·r1(i)]σθ : rθ(θ(B)). Since iθ(B) is
a subformula of X(B), which is properly annotated by H-1, the index i does
not occur in θ(B) so that rϕ(θ(B)) = rθ(θ(B)). Thus, given that σϕ = σθ and
rϕ(i) = [u1 · r1(i)]σθ, we obtain JPAL(K) ` r1(ϕ(A))σϕ → rϕ(i) : rϕ(θ(B)).
Hence, JPAL(K) ` r1(ϕ(A))σϕ → rϕ(iθ(B)), or
JPAL(K) ` r1(ϕ(A))σϕ → rϕ(ϕ(B)),
which is C-1 for the positive subformula ϕ(p).
Modal subcase 2. If iθ(p) is a negative subformula of X(p) so that
i = 2j is even, set rϕ := rθ. By C-1 for this negative occurrence of θ(p),
JPAL(K) ` rθ(θ(B)) → r1(θ(A))σθ. By Internalization, construct a ground
term u1 such that
JPAL(K) ` u1 : [rθ(θ(B))→ r1(θ(A))σθ] (18)
and set
xnσϕ :=
{
u1 · xj if n = j
xnσθ otherwise.
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C-4 for ϕ(p) trivially follows from C-4 for θ(p).
C-2 and C-3. Since σϕ differs from σθ only on xj, it is sufficient to note
two things. First, the only variable in xjσϕ = u1 · xj is xj so that C-3 for
ϕ(p) follows from C-3 for θ(p). Second, xj is in input position in 2jθ(p) and
any input position in θ(p) is also an input position in 2jθ(p) so that C-2 for
ϕ(p) follows from C-2 for θ(p).
C-1. JPAL(K) ` xj : rθ(θ(B)) → u1 · xj : r1(θ(A))σθ follows from (18) by
the application axiom and MP. Since rϕ(ϕ(B)) = rθ(2jθ(B)) = xj : rθ(θ(B))
and xjσϕ = u1·xj, JPAL(K) ` rϕ(ϕ(B))→ (xjσϕ) : r1(θ(A))σθ. Since2jθ(A)
is a subformula of X(A) and r1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(A)
by H-2, the variable xj does not occur in r1(θ(A)). Consequently,
(xjσϕ) : r1(θ(A))σθ = (xjσϕ) : r1(θ(A))σϕ =
[xj : r1(θ(A))]σϕ = [r1(2jθ(A))]σϕ = [r1(ϕ(A))]σϕ
Thus, we have obtained C-1 for the negative subformula ϕ(p):
JPAL(K) ` rϕ(ϕ(B))→ r1(ϕ(A))σϕ .
Announcement case. If ϕ(p) = [θ]η(p) and 〈rη, ση〉 has been constructed,
set σϕ := ση and
rϕ(n) :=
{
rη(n) if n occurs in η(B)
r1(n) otherwise.
Recall that p does not occur within announcements like θ. We show that
〈rϕ, σϕ〉 witnesses the goodness of an occurrence of [θ]η(p) in X(p) under
the assumption that 〈rη, ση〉 witnesses the goodness of the corresponding
occurrence of η(P ). It is easy to see that rϕ is a realization function.
C-2 and C-3 for ϕ(p) easily follow from C-2 and C-3 for η(p) because
σϕ = ση. For C-2, it is sufficient to note that any 2j occurring in η(p) also
occurs in [θ]η(p).
C-4. Suppose r1 is non-self-referential on variables over X(B). Then rη
is too by C-4 for η(p). Hence, a variable xk does not occur in either r1(n) or
rη(n) for any n occurring in Z(B) for some subformula 2kZ(B) of X(B).
Thus, xk does not occur in rϕ(Z(B)) and rϕ is non-self-referential on variables
over X(B).
C-1. The statement that needs to be demonstrated depends on the polar-
ity of this occurrence of [θ]η(p). We only show one of the two cases since the
other is analogous. Let this occurrence be positive. Then the corresponding
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occurrence of η(p) is also positive. In order to show C-1, i.e., given that
θ contains no modalities, to show JPAL(K) ` [θ]r1(η(A))σϕ → [θ]rϕ(η(B)),
it is sufficient to apply the admissible announcement necessitation rule, the
normality axiom, and MP to JPAL(K) ` r1(η(A))σϕ → rϕ(η(B)), which is
the same as JPAL(K) ` r1(η(A))ση → rη(η(B)), i.e., as C-1 for this positive
occurrence of η(p).
After proving this theorem, general enough to carry the induction through,
we formulate a weaker statement we are going to use to prove realization:
Corollary 41 (Replacement for JPAL(K)). Assume the following:
1. A proposition p has exactly one occurrence in a properly annotated
formula X(p) that is outside of announcements. X(A) and X(B) are
properly annotated formulas with no modalities within announcements.
2. r1 is a realization function, non-self-referential on variables over X(A)
and over X(B).
3. If p occurs positively in X(p), JPAL(K) ` r1(A)→ r1(B).
If p occurs negatively in X(p), JPAL(K) ` r1(B)→ r1(A).
Then there exists a realization function r and a substitution σ such that
JPAL(K) ` r1(X(A))σ → r(X(B))
and r is non-self-referential on variables over X(B).
It remains to extend the notions of one-step reduction and of reduction
to annotated modal formulas (with announcements). To achieve this it is
sufficient to replace the 4th row in the table in (3) by
Redex Its reduct
[A]iB i(A→ [A]B) (19)
The functions red1 and red for annotated formulas are defined the same way
as in Definition 5 but based on the new set of reductions. Accordingly,
red1(A) is an annotated formula and red(A) is an annotated formula without
announcements whenever A is an annotated formula.
Since the only difference in how red1 works on Fml,[·]-formulas and on
annotated formulas is such that erasing annotations in a pair of redex/reduct
of the annotated red1 yields a pair of redex/reduct of the unannotated red1,
the following lemma is not very surprising:
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Lemma 42. Let D be a properly annotated variant of D′ ∈ Fml,[·] and let
neither one contain modalities within announcements.3 Then red1(D) and
red(D) are properly annotated variants of red1(D
′) and red(D′) respectively,
neither red1(D) nor red1(D
′) contains modalities within announcements, and
neither red(D) nor red(D′) contains announcements.
Proof. That red1(D) is an annotated version of red1(D
′) and, hence, red(D) is
an annotated version of red(D′) is clear from the definition. Thus, it remains
to prove that red1 preserves the properness of annotations and the property
of not having modalities within announcements. We will only show this for
the pair of redex/reduct from (19). The other four cases are even simpler.
Let D = X([A]iB) for some X(p) and red1 maps it to X(i(A → [A]B)).
By assumption, A contains no modalities and p is outside of announcements
in X(p). Hence, after the replacement i and the modalities in B remain
outside of announcements. Further, all annotations in i(A → [A]B), i.e.,
i and all annotations in B, do not occur in X(p) because D is properly an-
notated. The duplication of A does not violate the properness of annotation
because A is modality-free.
We now have all the ingredients sufficient to establish our realization
theorem. The following diagram shows how we obtain it. We start with a
formula D′ ∈ Fml,[·]. Taking its arbitrary properly annotated version D,
using annotated reduction from Lemma 42, K realization from Theorem 39,
and replacement from Corollary 41, we construct a formula r(D) ∈ FmlJ that
realizes D. It is easy to see that (r(D))◦ = D′.
D r(D)
red(D) rK(red(D))
Reduction
K realization
Replacement to ‘invert’ red
Forgetful projection
Theorem 43 (Realization for PAL(K)). If D′ is a theorem of PAL(K) that
does not contain modalities within announcements, then for any properly
annotated version D of D′, there is a realization function r such that r(D) is
provable in JPAL(K) and (r(D))◦ = D′.
Proof. Let D be a properly annotated version of D′. Clearly, D contains
no modalities within announcements. By Lemma 42, there exists a se-
quence of properly annotated formulas D0, D1, . . . , DN that do not con-
tain modalities within announcements and a sequence of Fml,[·]-formulas
3If one does not contain them, then the other does not either.
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D′0, D
′
1, . . . , D
′
N that do not contain modalities within announcements such
that D0 = D,D
′
0 = D
′, Di+1 = red1(Di) and D′i+1 = red1(D
′
i) for each
i = 0, . . . , N − 1, DN = red(D), D′N = red(D′), neither DN nor D′N con-
tains announcements, and Di is a properly annotated version of D
′
i for each
i = 0, . . . , N . By Lemma 6, PAL(K) ` D′ ↔ D′N . Hence, D′N is also a
theorem of PAL(K). Given that D′N contains no announcements, it is also a
theorem of K due to the conservativity of PAL(K) over K. By Theorem 39,
there exists a realization function rN that is non-self-referential on variables
over the properly annotated version DN of D
′
N such that rN(DN) is prov-
able in J and, hence, in its extension JPAL(K). We now construct realiza-
tion functions rN−i, non-self-referential on variables over DN−i, such that
rN−i(DN−i) is a theorem of JPAL(K) for i = 0, . . . , N by induction on i.
The base case is already established. Let rN−(i−1) = rN−i+1 be already con-
structed. Since DN−i+1 = red1(DN−i), it follows that DN−i = X(Redex)
for some X(p) with exactly one occurrence of a fresh proposition p whereas
DN−i+1 = X(Reduct), where Redex is the outermost leftmost redex in DN−i
and Reduct is the reduct of Redex. We want to apply Corollary 41 to X(p),
Reduct, Redex, and rN−i+1. Assumption 1 is satisfied because DN−i and
DN−i+1 are properly annotated and by definition of red1 (recall also that
an outermost redex never occurs within announcements). That rN−i+1 is
non-self-referential on variables over X(Reduct) = DN−i+1 follows from the
induction hypothesis. Looking at the five types of redexes and their reducts,
it is easy to check that rN−i+1 is also non-self-referential on variables over
X(Redex) because the substitution of Redex for Reduct at p in X(p) never
introduces new modalities and never moves modalities into the scope of other
modalities (recall that announcements contain no modalities). Hence, as-
sumption 2 is satisfied. It remains to note that r(Redex)↔ r(Reduct) is one
of the axioms of JPAL(K)4 for any realization function r, including rN−i+1,
so that assumption 3 is also satisfied, independent of the polarity of p in
X(p). By Corollary 41, there exists a realization function rN−i, non-self-
referential on variables over X(Redex) = DN−i, and a substitution σi such
that JPAL(K) ` rN−i+1(X(Reduct))σi → rN−i(X(Redex)). In other words,
JPAL(K) ` rN−i+1(DN−i+1)σi → rN−i(DN−i). It remains to use the induc-
tion hypothesis, the Substitution Property, and MP to see that rN−i(DN−i)
is a theorem of JPAL(K). In particular, rN−N(DN−N) = r0(D) is provable in
JPAL(K). Set r := r0. Clearly, (r(D))
◦ = D′.
Remark 44. It is not clear how to generalize our proof to theorems of PAL(K)
with modalities allowed within announcements. The problem is that a reduct
[A]C → [A]D has two copies of A, which need to be combined into only
4This is not the case in OPAL(K) for redex/reduct pairs from (19).
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one copy in the corresponding redex [A](C → D). In general, the outer 
in A’s in the reduct will be realized by different terms, and we currently
lack methods of merging terms within announcements.
Remark 45. Unfortunately, adapting this proof to OPAL(K) presents certain
challenges. The problem is that in order to ‘invert’ the reduction from PAL(K)
to K, we need to apply replacement also in negative positions. This is only
possible because in the update axiom (update) of JPAL(K), we have the same
evidence term on both sides of the equivalence. If, like in OPAL(K), we work
with update operations ⇑ and ⇓ on terms, then we end up with different
terms in the update axioms, which prevents the use of Fitting’s replacement
at negative positions.
7 Conclusion
We present JPAL(K) and OPAL(K), two alternative justification logic counter-
parts of Gerbrandy–Groeneveld’s modal public announcement logic PAL(K).
One of PAL(K)’s update principles is
(A→ [A]B)→ [A]B ,
which we render in JPAL(K) as
s : (A→ [A]B)→ [A]s :B
and in OPAL(K) as
s : (A→ [A]B)→ [A]⇑ s :B .
For the semantics, we use a combination of the traditional semantics for
public announcement logic (where an agent rejects as impossible the worlds
that are inconsistent with the announcement made) and evidence functions
from epistemic models for justification logic (that specify for each world
which formulas an evidence term can justify). We then show soundness and
completeness (by a canonical model construction) for JPAL(K) and OPAL(K).
The main result of the paper is a realization theorem stating that JPAL(K)
realizes all the theorems of PAL(K) that do not contain modalities within an-
nouncements. To obtain this result we have to extend Fitting’s replacement
theorem such that, first, it works in the context of public announcements
and, second, it allows replacement also in negative positions.
Finally, it should be noted that our novel realization method does not
rely on a cut-free deductive system for PAL(K). Its constructiveness, however,
depends on constructive realization for the modal logic K, to which we reduce
PAL(K).
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